The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 3
Issue 5 May

Article 2

May 1976

An Examination of "Right to Treatment" Standards: Mental Health
Policy within the Context of the State Hospital System
Kathryn Glass

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Clinical and Medical Social Work Commons, Psychiatric and Mental Health Commons, and
the Social Work Commons

Recommended Citation
Glass, Kathryn (1976) "An Examination of "Right to Treatment" Standards: Mental Health Policy within the
Context of the State Hospital System," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 3 : Iss. 5 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol3/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

AN EXAMINATION OF "RIGHT TO TREATMENT" STANDARDS:
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE STATE
HOSPITAL SYSTEM
KATHRYN GLASS, M.Ed.

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the use of court-imposed standards for public mental
hospitals as a method of improving public mental health services. The standards
set out in Wyatt v. Stickney are examined, and the author concludes that if implemented nationally such standards would transform the public hospitals.
In
addition, implementation would alter the power structure of mental health workers,
effect the allocation of state and federal funds, and influence the larger system
of mental health services. Socio-economic characteristics of public mental
hospital patients, and an assessment of present care in this system are presented
as central issues in mental health policy and planning.

Introduction
Conditions in our nation's state hospitals* have been less than therapeutic
since their establishment over a century ago. While most states report having
1
standards and/or licensing for psychiatric facilities,
this cannot be taken as
evidence of decent care: In 1969 Alabama reported having standards for the state
mental hospitals, but the poor care and treatment received there has since been
made public. Efforts by professional and lay organizations to fulfill standards
which would provide adequate care and treatment have largely failed to transform
the public hospitals.
Fifteen years ago the suggestion was made that adequate care and treatment
2
of the mentally ill should be a constitutional right.
The grounds for such a
right were developed through a number of legal actions and it was confirmed in an
3
Alabama U.S. District Court case, Wyatt v. Stickney, in 1971.
In addition to
declaring a constitutional right to treatment Federal Judge Frank Johnson Jr.
mandated and defined adequate care and treatment. The standards set out in the
Wyatt order of 19724 (hereinafter "the Wyatt standards") were the first such
standards issued by a court, and by far the most comprehensive and ambitious set
of standards issued by any body in this country. Previous standards did not
approach the scope or authority of the Wyatt order. The Wyatt standards are not

* "State hospitals," "public mental hospitals," or "public hospitals" in
this paper refer to state and county hospitals for mentally ill adults.
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only guiding the upgrading of services in Alabama, 5 but they serve as a model to
other states struggling with the same issues.
This paper will examine the Wyatt standards as mental health policy. An overview of conditions in the public hospitals, the characteristics of the people who
use them, and an analysis of the standards will be presented.
Assessing the quality of care in public hospitals
Since the beginnings of institutionalization for mental illness in the early
1800's, mental health professionals have generally agreed that outcome depends on
certain factors including hospital size, staff-patient ratio, the opportunity for
individual attention, and the hospital's psychological and physical environment.
The most favorable outcome has been associated with hospitals no larger than one
or two hundred beds where there is sufficient staff to give individualized treatment and where a comfortable, supportive environment exists.
Private hospitals* have aimed for these conditions with considerable success,
while public hospitals have typically fallen far short of the ideal and in many
cases have provided the antithesis of what was considered to be therapeutic care.
This paper is limited to an examination of the public system of care; however, the
existence of a dual system of care must be noted as a factor in standard setting
and implementation. Events affecting public care occur within the larger framework of public and private systems. So long as a private system exists which provides adequate care and treatment (for those fortunate enough to have access to
it) there may be little incentive for policy makers to convert the public system.
The following discussion is presented with a recognition of this larger framework.
The majority of hospitalized mentally ill people in the country utilize public mental hospitals. There were 324 state and county hospitals in 1971 with
about 340,000 inpatient residents at the end of the year. There were approximately 745,000 patient care episodes** in public hospitals in 1971.6 Public hospitals are typically larger than what has traditionally been considered optimum:
* "Private mental hospitals": operated privately by an individual, partnership, corporation, or non-profit organization; includes non-profit and for-profit
hospitals.
** "Patient care episode" is a measure of utilization of facilities developed
by N.I.M.H. "Patient care episodes are defined as the number of residents in
inpatient facilities at the beginning of the year. . . . plus the total additions
to these facilities during the year."
(N.I.M.H. Utilization of Mental Health
Facilities 1971. (Series B, No. 5) Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare:
Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 2.)

The number of residents per hospital ranged from a few hundred to over a thousand.
Gross overcrowding, a characteristic of public hospitals, has been reduced in
recent years, but may still exist in some regions.
Staff size and composition, a critical component of care and treatment, has
not been ideally determined. There is however general agreement regarding the
numbers necessary to provide a minimum level of treatment, and it is generally
agreed that the public hospital system falls short. Staffing patterns very widely: In 1974 the geographic region with the lowest staff-patient ratio had half the
8
number of staff per patient population as the region with the highest ratio.
Per diem costs, or "Daily Maintenance Expenditures per Resident Patient,"
can be one indication of the level of services offered in a hospital. Per diem
costs include: clothing, room and board; all professional treatment including
medical services and medication.
When Wyatt v. Stickney was initiated in 1970, the per diem cost in Alabama
was $7.00 and the national average was $15.00. 9 Wyatt testimony and media coverage at that time revealed the gross neglect and destitute condition of patients
in Alabama state hospitals. The following graph indicates that in 1970 fourteen
states spent only about $5.00 per day more than Alabama, and sixteen spent about
$10.00 more. Only four states spent $30.00 or more per day.
Figure 1.10 Daily Maintenance Expenditures Per Resident Patient,
State Hospitals (1970)
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Colo.
Alaska
40.00

7

A general picture of the level of care in state hospitals can be inferred from
this data.
In 1973, daily expenditures per patient ranged from $10.00 to $65.00, averaging $25.00. Twenty-four states exceeded the average--seven states spent
$40.00 or more per day--and only three states (Mississippi, S. Carolina and W.
Virginia) spent less than $15.00. 11
Per patient expenditures in public hospitals have been steadily increasing,
probably due to decreasing patient population, 12 increased salaries, and inflation. Despite this trend, the percentage of the total state expenditures
which each statespends to maintain its public mental hospitals has decreased
steadily since first measured in 1957. There has been an average decrease of
13% from 1966 to 1970:
Figure 2.13 State Hospital Allocations As A Percent of Total General
State Expenditures, U.S. Average.
3.31%
2.53%
2.20%

1956

1966

.13% Decrease

11970

While the 2.20% spent in 1970 represents more dollars than the 3.31% spent in
1956--approximately seven billion and three billion nationwide, respectively-the percentage increase in other categories (e.g., highways, education, utilities) has been much greater. It should be noted that the decrease in percentage spent on mental health has occurred at the same time as the expansion of
services. Community services have been funded primarily by the federal government but required a gradually larger share from the states.
A final indicator in assessing care is mortality rate: in 1973 the mortality
rate for public mental hospital patients was slightly over 7 %. 15 No comparable
figures exist for private hospitals or institutions in general, but the mortality
rate is slightly under 1% in the general population. 16 A possible explanation
for the high rate in public hospitals is the poor medical attention resulting
from 1) inadequate numbers of qualified medical personnel
and 2) inability to
17
give individual care due to staff shortages in general.
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Characteristics of public hospital patients
Utilization of state hospitals is similar to utilization of public psychiatric inpatient facilities in general as to socio-economic characteristics. In
addition to state hospitals, public psychiatric inpatient facilities include
Veterans Administration (VA) inpatient services, general hospitals, residential
treatment centers for emotionally disturbed children, and Community Mental Health
Centers (CMHCs). Where possible, data on state hospitals is presented separately;
otherwise it is included in "all public inpatient services" data.
Public hospitals make up only 17% of all public inpatient services but account
for about one third of 18admissions and about three quarters of resident patients
in inpatient services.
The most striking feature of the public hospital patient population is the
racial composition. The majority of admissions are white--in 1969, 300,000 were
white, 60,000 non-white. 19 However, the chart on admission rates to these
hospitals (Figure 3. on following page) reveals that the non-white* rate is about
one and a half times that of the white rate within each age group.
This disproportionate representation is consistent throughout public inpatient facilities (see Table A. on following page).
The disproportionate representation of non-whites in total admissions does
not necessarily mean that the incidence of mental illness is higher among this
group. The effect of racism on institutionalization rates, and studies of prevalence of mental illness in different racial groups, 22 suggests that race is not
directly related to mental illness. Race may be related to hospitalization rates,
as it is closely linked to socio-economic status. Further data reveals a close
tie between hospitalization and socio-economic status.
Figure 4. (see page
) illustrates marital status, sex and age characteristics of public hospital patients.
A survey of educational backgrounds of public hospital patients reveals the
pattern shown in Figure 5. (see page
).
Heads of "female-head" families are more likely to be hospitalized than heads
of husband-wife families, and in general heads of families who are aged 18-24
have a higher admission rate than older "heads." Admission rates for persons
from small families are highest, and decrease as family size increases. Adults
living alone had higher admission rates than those living with friends or
*This term is loosely used in data collection and reporting, sometimes excluding Spanish-Americans and other minority groups, sometimes including them.
It can be assumed that it gives a conservative estimate of minority representation.
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Figure 3.20 Admission Rates
Hospitals (1969).
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800

Non-white
M ale

700
0

o

600
S

0

N

on-white
emale

,-',, 400

UI.,4

--..

r_0

.,1

300

.

ite

.W

Male

Site Female

200

100

14-17

18-24

25-34

35-44

45-64

65+

21
Admission Rates Per 100,000 Population By Sex and Color, All
TABLE A.
Public Inpatient Services (1971).

White
Males
Females
Non-white
Males
Females

-497-

Admission Rates
362
481
248
713
930
512

Figure 4.23 Admission Rates Per 100,000 Population By Marital Status, Sex
And Age, State Hospitals (1969).
Males
3000

Females

-

-Married
Divorced/Separated
---- Never Married
-------Widowed

000

-

500
0
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-64 65+

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-64 65+

Age At Admission

Figure 5.24 Admission Rates Per 100,000 Population By Highest Grade
Completed and Sex, State Hospitals (1969).
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Diagnosis is not of itself a factor in conditions of care and treatment,
although attitudes about a particular diagnostic label certainly can affect conditions. One third of all admissions to state hospitals are diagnosed Schizo26
the most debilitatiug and "incurable" mental disorder.
phrenic,
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In further regard to diagnoses, it was determined that over 1500 patients
residing in Alabama state hospitals were geriatric patients who required no
psychiatric treatment and should have been in nursing homes, and over 1000 patients
were mentally retarded, requiring services not appropriate to the supposed purpose
of mental hospitalization.Z7 It is apparent that, regardless of diagnosis, some
percentage of patients in public mental hospitals should not be there; that is,
if the purpose of these hospitals is indeed to treat psychiatric disorders.
In summary, the data suggests that hospitalization for mental illness is
closely related to race and socio-economic class. In their study of Social Class
and Mental Illness, Hollingshead and Redlich have reported that of persons under
treatment, both the incidence and prevalence of psychoses increases with each
successively lower class. 2 8 They conclude that
the excess of psychoses from the poorer area is a product of
the life conditions
entailed in the lower socio-economic strata
29
of the society.
However, since their sample consisted only of persons in treatment (representing
only 5% of all persons needing treatment, according to the Mid-Manhattan study 30)
their conclusions apply only to people in treatment, and might more appropriately
be stated thus: diagnosis and hospitalization for severe mental disorder is related to socio-economic status.
Noting that the admission rate for blacks has been double that of whites for
at least forty years, NIMH suggests that the rates are affected by "the differential availability of mental health care, because of social and economic factors."31
Private psychiatrists care for between 750,000 and 1,200,000 persons annually,
yet the fact that almost 40% of public hospital admissions in 1969 reported no
previous psychiatric care 32 supports the suggestion that public mental hospitals
are the primary mental health facility for the lower classes.
Therefore, there exists a demonstrated--and widely recognized--need for
change within the public mental hospital system and within the larger system of
mental health care.
Possibilities for change prior to Wyatt
Although professionals and laymen were aware of the conditions in public
hospitals, efforts to improve them have not been effective. Proposed standards-e.g., the American Psychiatric Association (APA)3 3 , the Joint Commission of
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) 34 --have had little effect on these generally
impoverished hospitals: they could not meet standards so were not accredited; as
a result they could not attract qualified staff, thus further lowering the quality
of care. Exposes--such as Albert Deutch's classic The Shame of the States--and
official reports alike changed conditions very little.

A major change, the large reduction in hospital populations in recent years,
has been cited as an improvement. But c~mmunity resources were not developed to
meet the needs of these former patients and pre-release planning was often nil.
The former patients were often worse off than when hospitalized because the communities where they were "placed" became more antagonistic toward them. The increased number of staff per patient in the hospital theoretically has benefitted
the remaining population but without other improvements could scarcely transform
the total system.
A second major change, the Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) movement,
has no doubt affected conditions at the state hospitals, but indirectly and in
a limited way. The CMHC Act--the most comprehensive federal intervention in
mental health care to date--did not address the quality of care and treatment in
state mental hospitals. As an alternative and preventative measure to extended
care, the CMHC Act provided funding and guidelines to develop a community mental
health system. Subsequent funding was granted for mental hospital programs
which would "improve the quality of care and . . . provide in-service training
for the personnel manning the institutions."'35 Also, as a result of the CMHC
movement, hospital staffs were in some instances augmented by CMHC personnel and
programs were supplemented by the establishment of CMHC units within the state
hospital. These events tended to positively affect the conditions at the
hospital, but were part of an effort directed at integrating hospital services
into community services, not improving hospital conditions.
The CMHC Act sought to make treatment more available, earlier, and at low
cost to consumers. This thrust has had considerable success according to NIMH
figures: while the total number of patient care episodes has more than doubled
in the past twenty years,
state and county mental hospitals, which accounted for half
of the patient care episodes in 1955, now account for only about
a fifth of the yearly episodes . . . (whereas) outpatient psychiatric services . . . now
account for the largest proportion of
36
patient care episodes.
However, data on persons utilizing CMHCs suggests that the hospitals and CMHCs
serve slightly different groups of people: the educational level of hospital
patients is lower, with only a small percentage completing high school 37 compared
with about half of all CMHC clients completing high school; 3 8 male admission
rates far outnumber female admissions to hospitals while the admission rates are
about equal for men and women in CMHCs.
The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid also represented an attack on the
quality of public mental health services, supposedly to upgrade services for the
poor. But public mental patients under 65 were arbitrarily excluded from Medicaid benefits 39 and even patients over 65 couldn't receive benefits if the hospital in which they were "treated" didn't meet the standards set by Federal
regulation. Medicare coverage is limited to 190 days--a lifetime maximum--for
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psychiatric hospitalization, whereas other medical conditions may recur and be
40
These restrictions have served in many cases
covered for each spell of illness.
to perpetuate inadequate conditions, and have been cited as an example of racism
due to the disproportionately high use of public
on the part of the government
41
hospitals by blacks.
The Wyatt Standards
The Wyatt order defines adequate care and treatment as comprised of three
areas: a humane psychological and physical environment; a certain number of qualified staff; and individual attention. The standards are divided into improvements
in each of these three areas; in addition, the standards address what has been
termed "sanism" by Morton Birnbaum, who first suggested "a right to treatment":
Sanism is the irrational thinking, feeling and behavior patterns
of response by an individual or by a society to the irrational-and too often, even to the rational behavior--of a mentally ill
individual.42
Birnbaum emphasizes that sanism prevails no less among mental health professionals.
It has been suggested that, universally,
It is difficult to empathize with the mentally ill. It is unnatural , . . to share the feelings of someone who does not talk
about the same subject at the end of a sentence as he did at the
beginning, who sees and responds to things we do not see, whose
mood, reason and very identity may change from moment to moment.
disconcerting, and inevitably
These unfortunate people are uncanny,
43
alien to us. They invite rejection.
Birnbaum observes that sanism is
. . . An unnecessary and disabling oppressive burden that is added
society to the very real afby our bigoted and prejudiced sanist
44
fliction of severe mental illness.
The fact that the Wyatt standards are the only comprehensive and specific proposal with power to provide adequate care and treatment in the nearly two centuries of public care of the mentally ill supports Birnbaum's conclusions.
The Wyatt standards attack many specific manifestations of sanism that have
persisted in public hospitals. Whether established for staff's convenience--e.g.,
the use of uniforms or communal garments for patients rather than personal clothing--or simply out of a sense of extreme indifference--e.g., the apparent assumption that mental patients don't care about their surroundings--many daily
routines have degraded, restricted unnecessarily, exploited, and deprived patients.
The Wyatt standards address these routines in Standards 1-20; entitled "Humane
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Psychological and Physical Environment."

The Wyatt standards in general provide that any deviation from their provisions must be justified by the hospital staff and can only be of limited duration. For example, Standard 4 assures visitation rights
except to the extent that the Qualified Mental Health Professional responsible for formulation of a particular patient's treatment
plan writes an order imposing special restrictions. The written
order must be renewed after each periodic review of the treatment
plan if any restrictions are to be continued.
Standards 1-20 are briefly presented below:
1. Patients have a right to privacy and dignity.
2. Patients have a right to the least restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of commitment.
3. No person shall be deemed incompetent to manage his affairs . . .
solely by reason of his admission or commitment to the hospital.
4. Patients shall have the same rights to visitation and telephone
communications as patients at other public hospitals. ...
5. Patients shall have an unrestricted right to send sealed mail. ...
6. Patients have a right to be free from unnecessary or excessive
medication. .
7. Patients have a right to be free from physical restraint and isolation. ...

8. Patients shall have a right not to be subjected to experimental
research. ...
9. Patients have a right not to be subjected to treatment procedures
such as lobotomy, electro-convulsive treatment, adversive reinforcement
conditioning or other unusual or hazardous treatment. ...
10. Patients have a right to receive prompt and adequate medical
treatment. ...
11. Patients have a right to wear their own clothes and to keep and use
their own personal possessions. ...
12. The hospital has an obligation to supply an adequate allowance of clothing to any patients who do not have suitable clothing of
their own. . . . Such clothing shall be considered the patient's throughout his stay in the hospital.
13. The hospital shall make provision for the laundering of patient
clothing.
14. Patients shall have a right to regular physical exercise several
times a week.
15. Patients have a right to be outdoors at regular and frequent
intervals. . ..

16. The right to religious worship shall be accorded to each patient
who desires such opportunities. . ..
-502-

17. The institution shall provide, with adequate supervision,
suitable opportunities for the patient's interaction with members of
the opposite sex.
Standard 18 addresses the issue of institutional peonage, a longstanding conInstitutional peonage
cern of civil libertarians and many mental health workers.
can be defined as the uncompensated patient labor at a task which otherwise would
have to be performed by a hospital employee, e.g., mopping floors, laundering
clothes, etc. This labor has been defended as "therapeutic" or called "job training", and has been typically required of patients. When compensated, such work
has been paid for in insufficient and degrading ways: a few cents an hour; extra
cigarettes; special consideration for release; or privileged status.
Standard 18 defines the circumstances under which patient labor is appropriate, and sets out rules governing labor. The first rule sets the general
limits:
No patient shall be required to perform labor which involves
the operation and maintenance of the hospital or for which the
hospital is under contract with an outside organization. Privileges or release from the hospital shall not be conditioned upon
the performance of labor covered by this provision. Patients may
voluntarily engage in such labor if the labor is compensated in
accordance with the minimum wage laws of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. ...
The second rule covers those tasks which might be deemed therapeutic; a third
rule permits personal housekeeping activity; and the last rule states that payment
for labor cannot be applied to hospital fees.
Standards 19 and 20 describe minimum physical facilities and nutrition which
Standard 19 covers various areas of patient life
must be available to patients.
including sleeping quarters, lavatories, day rooms, etc., as well as the temperature and ventilation of these areas. Details such as "one tub or shower for
each 15 patients" are set out, similar to JCAH standards. The overall goal of
Standard 19 is that:
facilities . . . designed to afford patients with comfort and
safety, promote dignity, and ensure privacy . . . make a positive
contribution to the efficient attainment of the treatment goals
of the hospital.
Standard 20 states that "patients, except for the non-mobile, shall eat or
be fed in dining rooms" and sets out minimum nutritional requirements.
(It should
Implementation of rights in Standards 1-20 would be very costly.
4
be noted that while most states recognize patients' rights in varying degrees, S
labor,
patient
Standard 18 alone, governing
implementation is not assured.)

would be enormously expensive: a Pennsylvania state official has stated that there
is
no justification for having patients work without compensation,
however, institutions legitimately complain that lack of staff,
lack of monies, primitive equipment 4 and
increasing admissions
6
have necessitated patients to work.
In Pennsylvania a lawsuit brought by patient-workers at various state hospitals
has resulted in a consent decree specifying conditions of patient employment.
In May 1974, when the lawsuit was filed, there were 6,000 patients in the state
working 30 or more hours per week for little or no remuneration. By December
1974 there were 400 patient workers. Since patients are now permitted to work
only 15 hours a week and must be paid at least the rate for handicapped workers,
the economic effect of this legal action is indeed enormous.
The standards governing physical facilities--Standard 19--would also require
large financial commitment. Most hospitals do not now provide the semi-private
accomodations set out therein, and for many hospitals major renovations would be
necessary to meet fire and safety requirements, maintain comfortable temperatures,
and provide minimum numbers of bathroom facilities.
Some standards merely require changing hospital patterns (albeit not a simple
undertaking) rather than large financial output: rights to privacy and dignity;
visitation, telephone and mail use; the right to wear their own clothing; the
right to be outdoors and have regular exercise; the right to interact with members
of the opposite sex.
Other standards impinge on what has traditionally been defended by professionals as their exclusive domain: the use of medication (Standard 6), physical restraint (Standard 7), research (Standard 8), and treatments (Standard 9) such as
lobotomy, shock, and aversive conditioning. The American Psychiatric Association,
in their "Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of Treatment" stated
that "It is the responsibility of the physician to determine the appropriate
treatment techniques to fit the individual patients' physical and psychological
needs, assets and circumstances,"'4 7 and "The definition of treatmqnt and the
appraisal of its adequacy are matters for medical determination." 8 In an amicus
brief filed with the Wyatt court regarding amendments to Section 9, the A.P.A.
maintained this bias,
while other professional organizations expressed closer
allegiance with Judge Johnson's intent.5 0
Standards 21-24 are entitled "Qualified Staff in Numbers Sufficient to Administer Adequate Treatment." Standard 21 requires that all professional staff
meet state licensing and certification requirements. Standard 22 provides for
"substantial orientation training" for non-professionals and on-going inservice
training for all staff. Standard 23 requires supervision of non-professionals
by professionals.
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Standard 24 required the following minimum number of staff per 250 patients:

Classification

Number of
Employees

Unit Director
Psychiatrist (3 years' residency
training in psychiatry)
MD (Registered physicians)
Nurses (RN)
Licensed Practical Nurses
Aide III
Aide II
Aide I
Hospital Orderly
Clerk Stenographer II
Clerk Typist II
Unit Administrator
Administrative Clerk
Psychologist (Ph.D.) (doctoral
degree from accredited
program)
Psychologist (M.A.)
Psychologist (B.S.)

Social Worker (MSW) (from
accredited program)
Social Worker (B.A.)
Patient Activity Therapist (M.S.)
Patient Activity Aide
Mental Health Technician
Dental Hygienist
Chaplain
Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor
Mental Health Field Representative
Dietitian
Food Service Supervisor
Cook II
Cook I
Food Service Worker
Vehicle Driver
Housekeeper
Messenger
Maintenance Repairman

1
2
4
12
6
6
16
70
10
3
3
1
1

1
1
2

2
S
1
10
10
1
.5
1
1
1
1
2
3
15
1
10
1
2

While the A P A , the J C A H and other standard-setting bodies have long recognized the correlation between number of staff and treatment success, they
typically did not specify numbers because they recognized that minimum levels
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would not be met. Instead they recommended "staff sufficient in number and skills
51
to meet the needs of the patients and to achieve program goals. '
The Wyatt standards 5 2 would improve staff ratios in many states, although
comparison with the U.S. average in selected categories indicates the following:
TABLE B.5 3 Wyatt Staff Ratio Standards And State Hospital Staff Ratio,
U.S. Average (1973).
Wyatt
U.S. Average
Psychiatrists
Physicians (M.D.)
Psychologists
Social Workers
Registered Nurses

1.4
2.8
2.8
4.9
8.4

2.4
1.2
1.3
2.8
7.1

Wyatt proposes about half the number of psychiatrists as are now on staff: the
number of R.N.s would increase slightly; the number of social workers would be
increased by about two-fifths; the largest increase would be more than double
the number of M.D.s and psychologists now on staff.
A breakdown of the U.S. average reveals a wide range of professional staff
ratio, between geographic regions and within geographic regions. The higheststaffed region is compared below to the lowest-staffed region, with the range
within each region also presented:
TABLE C.5 4

Staff Ratio Range: Highest and Lowest Staffed Regions
Highest Staffed Region

Lowest Staffed Region

Highest Lowest

Highest Lowest

Region VIII

Iowa

Neb.

Region IV

Ky.

S.C.

Psychiatrists
Physicians

5.9
1.7

6.7
5.5

1.0
1.0

1.4
1.7

1.1
1.2

Psychologists
Social Workers

2.7
6.7

10.6
9.4
4.0

9.4

4.5
S.5

1.0
l.8

0.6
3.6

0.8
1.6

14.2

19.2

3.8

6.2

3.3

Registered Nurses

10.7

a

The range within each professional category nationwide reveals a wide disparity, the lowest existing ratio in each category being far below Wyatt, the

highest far above except for M.D.s.
5
Staff Ratio Range: Highest and Lowest State In
TABLE D.S
Each Staff Category.

Wyatt
Psychiatrists
Physicians
Ps cholo ists
Social Workers
Registered Nurses

1.4
2.8
2.8
4.9
8.4

Highest Ratio
14.3
2.5
7.5
9.4
30.0

Lowest Ratio
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.7
3.3

(Colo.)
(Ariz.)
(Colo.)
(Iowa)
(Alas.)

(Ala.)
(Nev.; Haw.)
(Miss.)
(Miss.)
(Miss.)

The magnitude of the task of meeting Wyatt staffing standards is illustrated
through a comparison of Minnesota and Mississippi:
56

TABLE E.
Minnesota.

Population, Cost, Staff: Mississippi and
Miss.

Number of Patients Under Care (1974)
Average Daily Census
Annual Number of Patient Days

I

Daily Expenditures Per Resident Patient

Full Time Equivalent Inpatient Staff
57
TABLE F.

Minn.

13,590
10,5241
4,229
4,181
,526045 1,543,604
$23.52
$9.99
3,488
2,165

Staff Ratio: Mississippi and Minnesota.

Psychiatrist
Physicians
Psychologists
Social Workers
Registered Nurses

Wyatt

Miss.

1.4
2.8
2.8
4.9
8.4

0.5
0.S
0.3
0.7
1.4

IMinn.I
0.6
1.8
1.0
2.9
9.8

Minnesota is close to the national average ($25) in daily expenditures per
resident patient, yet has about half the recommended staff ratio except for nurses.
Therefore it can be conjectured that the majority of states--which spend $15.00
to $30.00 per day--would have to increase staff. That the size of increase would
be substantial is indicated by comparing Minnesota to Mississippi. Though they
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serve about the same number of patients, Mississippi has 1,300 less professional
staff and is considerably lower than Minnesota in staff-patient ratio. Apparently,
Mississippi would have to hire 1,300 new professional staff just to reach Minnesota's staffing level. Since Minnesota's staffing level is itself considerably
lower than Wyatt standards (except for nurses) and would have to increase its
staff as well, it is evident that thousands of additional professional personnel
alone would be required to meet Wyatt standards nationwide.
Standards 25-34, "Individualized Treatment Plans," seek not only to prevent
the mass treatment which has often resulted in institutionalization and neglect,
but also to assure accountability for each patient. Prompt and appropriate treatment are mandated for hospital and post-hospital care, and documentation and
approval is required at every step. This would entail not only increased staff
and services, but decreased professional autonomy as discussed above.
Judge Johnson stipulated that upon admission the patient and her family receive a written copy of the standards, and that a copy be posted on each ward.
The Court also established seven-member "human rights committees" at each state
hospital and appointed the members. The Committees are responsible for reviewing research proposals and rehabilitation programs "to ensure that the dignity
and the human rights of patients are preserved." The committee is also charged
with assisting patients who "allege that their legal rights have been infringed
or that the Mental Health Board has failed to comply with judicially ordered
guidelines."
The Wyatt standards apply primarily to inpatient psychiatric services. They
recognize the need for after-care (Standard 34) and continuity (Standards 26 &
27), but are limited to hospitals and do not address community care. However,
Wyatt does attack practices stemming from the fact of hospitalization: even after
release from the hospital, former mental patients are frequently arbitrarily restricted in many activities. Wyatt states that
No person shall be deemed incompetent to manage his affairs, to
contract, to hold professional or occupational or vehicle operator's licenses, to marry and obtain a divorce, to register and
vote, or to make a will solely by reason of his admission or
commitment to the hospital. (Standard 3)
Implementation would afford former mental patients greater status and greater access to goods and services.
Effects of the Wyatt Standards
The fundamental concept of adequate care and treatment established by the
Wyatt standards is hardly new: humanitarians since the early 1800's have recognized the necessity of a humane psychological and physical environment, a large
proportion of staff to patients, and individualized care in treating mental
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illness. Private mental hospitals are modeled on this concept of treatment.
Public mental hospitals, however, operating at the lowest possible cost, have
provided the bare minimum in surroundings and staff, and individualized treatment is impossible under those conditions.
Prevailing attitudes toward a particular group of people are an important
dynamic in policy development and implementation. Unfortunately, patients in
public mental hospitals suffer doubly; discriminated against on the basis of
their affliction or label, and subject to further discrimination on the basis
of their racial and socio-economic backgrounds.
It appears, through the failure of previous standard-setting efforts, that
adequate care and treatment in public mental hospitals can only be assured through
Federal judicial and/or legislative decisions. For instance even though Alabama has vigorously opposed compliance with Wyatt standards,8 many changes in9
cluding a substantial increase in daily maintenance expendituresS have occurred
as a result of Federal intervention. The former Alabama mental health commissioner has stated that

The tradition of appealing to the Constitution to expand narrow
conceptions of civil rights . . . still may be the last hope of
mental patients and their caregivers, against what remains in
and absurd funding priorities
most states as continuing6 neglect
0
set by state governments.
There is no doubt that national implementation of the Wyatt or similar
standards would drastically change the public mental hospital system. They would
alter the power structure of mental health workers and the pattern of labor distribution, effect the federal and state distribution of economic resources, and
influence the role of the public hospital in mental health services.
It is feasible that a shift or redistribution of power could occur in two
ways: First, as increased decision-making is given to patients, Human Rights
Committees, Technical Committees, Review Committees, in-hospital legal staff,
ombudsmen, etc., the mental health professional's realm of authority is reduced
and their decisions subject to review and veto. Since psychiatrists have traditionally hoarded power in the hospitals, Wyatt standards could result in a
greater interdependence among all staff, i.e., power once held by psychiatrists
being shared by all disciplines and levels. Wyatt speaks of "mental health professional" and does not single out psychiatrists as the ultimate authority.
Second, new careers and directions may emerge: if there simply are not
enough professionals available and/or willing to enable public hospitals to meet
the staffing standards, there could result a strong push for paraprofessional
training and utilization, and a real evaluation of this kind of contribution.
This would not only result in a different staffing pattern but would open up jobs
and career opportunities for non-professional staff, resulting in a change in

their status and economic situation as well. In addition or alternatively, a
scarcity of professionals for public hospital positions might prompt professional
training programs to re-examine their concept of service; perhaps professional
care would begin to be regarded more as a national rather than a regional or
otherwise restricted resource.
area.

These possibilities exist despite the status quo stance of Wyatt in this
The Wyatt order
unintentionally caters to the prestige interests of medical
and mental health professionals, few of whom have any interest
61
in state hospitals anyway.

Current funding on both federal and state levels would have to change in
order to implement Wyatt standards. It is difficult to compare existing N.I.M.H.
data on public hospital staffing with the Wyatt standards in order to determine
the gap between current services and adequate services. However, it seems a
reasonable estimate based on existing data that the vast majority of state and
county hospitals would fall below minimum standards in some areas, and perhaps
half of the hospitals would have to undertake major staffing recruitment and
building renovation programs to comply. In Alabama, the state immediately had
to raise a $2 million bond to correct fire hazards and hire an initial 500 employees in order6 2 to avoid court appointment of a master to oversee compliance
with standards.
Would the Wyatt standards eliminate or reduce the disparity between public
and private hospitals? Fully implemented, they would dramatically improve the
public hospitals but they would not close the gap in at least two areas: staff
to patient ratio and hospital size. Since private hospitals now employ five
times the number of professionals per 1,000 patients as public hospitals 6 3 and
the Wyatt standards would primarily raise the lower-staffed public hospitals to
the level of the higher-staffed public hospitals, the gap would remain.
The Wyatt standards attempt to affect the quality of life as well as availability of treatment staff: privacy, pleasant and stimulating surroundings, and
adequate space are all included, but the standards are applied to existing facilities--large institutional buildings, relics of "warehousing" policies, located
far from the community they serve. Wyatt takes no position regarding the size
of the facility although this factor has long been recognized as crucial to
treatment outcome.
Aims of Hospitalization
Further evaluation of Wyatt standards--or any policy regarding public mental
hospitals--is based on the long and short term aims of hospitalization; the role
of the hospital itself and the purpose of "care and treatment" in the hospital.
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The status of the public mental hospital was uncertain during the first years
of the CMHC movement, but seems to be generally regarded now as a necessary component in a comprehensive system. Considerable research has been done on how the
state hospital can be made relevant and effective. Acceptance of the hospital is
by no means unanimous: a number of groups advocate dismantling the system, and
64
some states are moving in that direction.
National implementation of the Wyatt
standards could terminate this debate: the mobilization of funds, labor, renovations, etc., necessary to convert the nations hospitals into treatment facilities
would not only firmly establish them but may alter the direction of future planning
for mental health services.
A recent article regarding the Wyatt standards noted
that:
Its reordering of state fiscal and policy priorities to meet
pressing needs in mental health has been appropriately hailed
as an important legal precedent; its focus, however, is exclusively on the allocation and expenditure of state funds for
mental health institutions. Given finite resources for mental
health services, this emphasis is inconsistent with the general
65
shift toward community-based mental health programs.
The author recommends the application of Wyatt standards with appropriate modification to all mental health services as a way to "prevent the diversion of
funds and resources from community mental health programs, and accomodate and
66
promote alternatives to institutional residential care.",
Apropo of this issue, Judge Johnson introduced a very important treatment
goal as a constitutional right in Standard 2: "the least restrictive conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment."
This concept has thus far
not been defined, but has attracted the attention of mental health planners and
lawyers active in patients rights. The implementation of this standard would cut
to the core in the present contest between the public mental hospitals and CMHCs
for funds and other resources.
Finally, serious consideration must be given to the dynamics determining
hospitalization. Two divergent approaches to the phenomenon seem apparent: one
is based on the assumption that hospitalization* is a necessary consequence of a
medical/psychological condition; the other is based on the assumption that hospitalization is a consequence of a sociological condition.
According to the first approach a person is hospitalized in order to be
treated for the medical/psychological condition and it is expected that hospital
treatment will improve or even cure the condition.
Within this "medical" framework, the racial and socio-economic characteristics of public hospital patients
might be explained by pointing to the increased risk to health and mental health

*

"Hospitalization" is distinguished from "mental illness."
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entailed by poverty conditions and severe
emotional stress experienced by non67
white and poor groups in this culture.
According to the second approach to the phenomenon of hospitalization, a
person is hospitalized primarily as a result of racial and/or socio-economic
characteristics. The homogeneity of public hospital patients in this regard may
result from a tendency to institutionalize certain groups: the former mental
health commissioner of Alabama has stated that
In Alabama, curiously, the counties that send the most patients
to state hospitals are usually the same ones that send the most
criminals to the state prisons. The decision about which asylum
the aberrant citizen will reside in is frequently a toss-up.
Demographic profiles of populations hiding out in state hospitals
and in state prisons would show important properties in common:
low socioeconomic, educational, and vocational levels; . . 68
It may be that non-institutional mental health services are not available to
this group, at least not to the extent that services are available to other groups.
Regardless of orientation--medical or social--policy makers cannot escape the
social component of public hospital use. Yet policies have been made and implemented as if hospitalization were a purely medical decision and in fact as if hospitalization were proven to be necessary and beneficial for all those hospitalized.*
Mental health knowledge is limited particularly regarding psychosis, and current treatment of mental disorders can best be characterized as an ongoing experiment. Bruce Ennis addressed this point in the following statement regarding
standards:
Adding more psychiatrists to mental hospital staffs may confer
the aura of adequate treatment, but not necessarily the substance.
Perhaps it would be wiser to utilize resources for basic empirical
research into the "causes" of mental illness. Only by learning
more about what mental illness is can we
6 9 intelligently determine
which types of treatment are adequate.
* The Wyatt opinion does not challenge the medical definition of mental illness; however, diagnosis is as dependent on social, cultural, political, and economic factors as is hospitalization. For a discussion of social and medical components in the process of diagnosis, see Peter Sedgwick, "Illness-Mental and Otherwise" and Robert M. Veatch, "The Medical Model: Its Nature & Problems" in The
Hastings Center Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1973. A political and economic analysis
of hospitalization is presented in Michael Foucault's Madness and Civilization
(New York: Random House, 1973), and Andrew Scull's Decarceration: A Radical View
(forthcoming book, Prentiss-Hall).
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Mental health professionals have not demonstrated that hospitalization is
beneficial and in fact some data and studies suggest that hospitalization is detrimental. David Rothman proposes the following:
Enough energy has already been spent on tinkering with institutional programs for the deviant. Let us instead cast out new
nets, try to devise programs not because we see the prospect of
ultimate cure but because we acknowledge our ignorance and think
we may be able to devise better strategies for coping with it.70
The conditions in public mental hospitals need attention: full implementation
of standards such as Wyatt would unquestionably improve conditions for hospitalized patients. However, implementation would also push mental health services in
a direction which may not be desired. Thoughtful policy planning in the area of
standards is necessary if this country hopes to finally eliminate "the shame of
the states."
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